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DLD-237        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 15-2213 
___________ 
 
IN RE:  DOROTHY HARTMAN, 
    Petitioner 
____________________________________ 
 
On a Petition for Writ of Mandamus from the 
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(Related to Civ. No. 2-13-cv-01909) 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Rule 21, Fed. R. App. P. 
June 11, 2015 
Before:  FISHER, SHWARTZ and GREENBERG, Circuit Judges 
  
 
(Filed: June 16, 2015) 
_________ 
 
OPINION* 
_________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Dorothy Hartman, proceeding pro se, has filed a petition for a writ of mandamus 
seeking review of Judge Diamond’s refusal to recuse himself from presiding over her 
civil case.  For the foregoing reasons, we will deny the petition for a writ of mandamus. 
 As the parties are familiar with the case, we will review the procedural history 
only as it pertains to the present mandamus petition.  In May 2013, Hartman filed a 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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complaint in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, 
alleging that Bank of New York Mellon (BNYM) and the City of Philadelphia violated 
her rights in connection with a foreclosure action brought against her in state court.  In 
December 2014, Hartman filed a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 455, seeking the recusal of 
Judge Diamond on the ground that he “has shown a propensity of prejudice and leniency 
toward . . . culpable defendants.”  Judge Diamond denied the motion.  Hartman then filed 
this petition for a writ of mandamus.  The case remains pending in the District Court.   
 Mandamus is a proper means by which we review the denial of a recusal motion 
filed pursuant to § 455.  Alexander v. Primerica Holdings, Inc., 10 F.3d 155, 163 (3d Cir.  
1993).  To determine whether mandamus relief is appropriate, we review the decision not 
to recuse for abuse of discretion.  See In re Kensington Int’l Ltd., 368 F.3d 289, 300-01 & 
n.12 (3d Cir. 2004).  Our inquiry is “whether the record, viewed objectively, reasonably 
supports the appearance of prejudice or bias.”  Id.  “[J]udicial rulings alone almost never 
constitute a valid basis for a bias or impartiality motion.”  Liteky v. United States, 510 
U.S. 540, 555 (1994). 
 Hartman argues that Judge Diamond “has consistently shown himself to be 
egregiously prejudiced against the Plaintiff and in favor of the Defendants.”  This 
allegation, however, is based primarily on ordinary judicial decision-making.  For 
instance, Hartman alleges that Judge Diamond “chose to improperly remand” the claims 
against BNYM to state court, “failed to review documents,” “refused to hold an 
evidentiary hearing,” “ignored Federal Rules of Evidence,” and “perjured the docket with 
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information he knew to be untrue.”  But mere dissatisfaction with rulings does not 
warrant recusal.  See Securacomm Consulting, Inc. v. Securacom Inc., 224 F.3d 273, 278 
(3d Cir. 2000) (“We have repeatedly stated that a party’s displeasure with legal rulings 
does not form an adequate basis for recusal.”).  Hartman also complains about Judge 
Diamond’s “attitude,” asserts that he exhibits a “personal interest in the case,” and alleges 
that he has been “unduly distrustful and suspicious of Plaintiff.”  These bare allegations 
are not sufficient to mandate recusal.  See Liteky, 510 U.S. at 555-56 (“Not establishing 
bias or partiality, however, are expressions of impatience, dissatisfaction, annoyance, 
image and even anger, that are within the bounds of what imperfect men and women . . . 
sometimes display.”); see also In re United States, 666 F.2d 690, 694 (1st Cir. 1981) 
(holding that recusal is not required on the basis of “unsupported, irrational, or highly 
tenuous speculation”).  Accordingly, we will deny the mandamus petition.  
